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Abstract. Dynamic pricing is used to maximize the revenue of a firm over a finite-period planning
horizon, given that the firm may not know the underlying demand curve a priori. In emerging markets,
in particular, firms constantly adjust pricing strategies to collect adequate demand information, which
is a process known as price experimentation. To date, few papers have investigated the pricing decision
process in a competitive environment with unknown demand curves, conditions that make analysis
more complex. Asynchronous price updating can render the demand information gathered by price
experimentation less informative or inaccurate, as it is nearly impossible for firms to remain informed
about the latest prices set by competitors. Hence, firms may set prices using available, yet out-of-date,
price information of competitors.
In this paper, we design an algorithm to facilitate synchronized dynamic pricing, in which competitive
firms estimate their demand functions based on observations and adjust their pricing strategies in a
prescribed manner. The process is called “learning and earning” elsewhere in the literature. The goal
is for the pricing decisions, determined by estimated demand functions, to converge to underlying
equilibrium decisions. The main question that we answer is whether such a mechanism of periodically
synchronized price updates is optimal for all firms. Furthermore, we ask whether prices converge to a
stable state and how much regret firms incur by employing such a data-driven pricing algorithm.
1 Introduction
Dynamic pricing is used to maximize a firm’s revenue over a finite-period planning horizon, given that
the firm may not know the underlying demand curve a priori. In emerging markets, in particular, firms
constantly adjust their pricing strategies to collect adequate demand information, which is a process termed
price experimentation by [5], [13]. Currently, few papers exist that consider competitive environments with
unknown demand curves. Such conditions add greater complexity to the analysis of the decision process.
Evaluating the influence of decisions made by competitors is challenging. If a firm is sensitive to competi-
tor prices, one might expect a change in the prices set by a firm to provoke an immediate response from
competitors. Such asynchronous price updating renders the demand information gathered by price experi-
mentation neither informative nor accurate, as it is almost impossible for each firm to remain informed about
the current prices set by competitors. Although firms may still observe the market response of consumers
given competitor pricing, the use of out-of-date price information is possible. A mechanism of synchronized
dynamic pricing thus arose. Such a mechanism ensures that the pricing strategy of each firm is adjusted in
a prescribed way to jointly collect demand information and make pricing decisions.
Consider a total of N firms selling an identical product in an oligopolistic market, in which the true
underlying demand curve and the presence of demand shocks are unknown. Over a time horizon of T periods,
firms make pricing decisions in each period t = 1, · · · , T . Firm i’s decision at period t is denoted by pit, and
the demand for firm i’s product in period t is denoted by Dit(pt) = λ
i(pt) + ε
i
t, where pt ≡ [p1t , · · · , pNt ]
represents the pricing decisions of all firms. The price set by a firm is the only information that its competitors
can observe. Hence, firms are unable to estimate the demand of competitors. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the mean value of Dit is given by the average rate λ
i, conditional on the price vector of all
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companies, while εit measures the demand shock in period t. Note that λ
i(p) reflects the fact that firm i
acknowledges that the price decisions made by other firms will influence the demand for the product of
firm i. By focusing on competition among the N firms, we do not consider capacity limitation, production
cost or marginal cost. Each firm is assumed to be selfish and reacts immediately to price changes made
by competitors. The goal of each firm is to sequentially set a price to maximize revenue under demand
uncertainty and competition.
Finding the equilibrium pricing strategy is a challenge that each firm must tackle. To do so requires
that firms constantly adjust prices according to the best response pricing strategy. In particular, when the
demand function is unknown, determining a suitable function for demand estimation will directly affect the
pricing decision. Such an estimation should consider the behaviour of competitors and the market response.
Fortunately, there is evidence that linear functions serve as good approximations of underlying demand
functions and allow pricing decisions to converge to an optimum in [3]. The present study designs an algorithm
of synchronized dynamic pricing in which firms in competition estimate their demand functions based on
observations and adjust their pricing strategies in a prescribed manner to maximize their revenues. The
process is termed learning and earning elsewhere in the literature. The goal of the process is for the pricing
decisions, determined by an estimated demand function, to converge to an underlying equilibrium decision.
The main question that we wish to answer is whether such a mechanism of periodically synchronised price
updating is optimal for all firms. Specifically, we ask whether the mechanism may allow prices to reach a
stable state and how much regret firms incur by employing such a data-driven pricing algorithm.
1.1 Our Results
This paper generalizes the work of [3], who constructed a dynamic pricing algorithm in a monopoly
setting in which a single firm chooses a price to maximize expected revenue without knowledge of the true
underlying demand curve. Although consideration of a competitive environment is complicated, we are still
able to obtain notable results, and, if the market is a monopoly, these findings are consistent with the results
of [3].
We propose a data-driven equilibrium pricing (DDEP) algorithm to solve the dynamic pricing decisions
of each firm in competition. As the true demand curve is unknown, each firm must estimate a demand curve
via a linear approximation scheme in which prices are varied to develop better pricing strategies. Throughout
the paper, we use period t or, equivalently, time t. Let pi∗t denote the equilibrium price of firm i at time t,
which is obtained by the estimated demand curve of firm i at time t, and let p−it denote the prices of other
competitors. A clairvoyant model implies that a firm has knowledge of the underlying demand curve and
the distribution of demand shocks. The goal of learning is to make pit converge to the clairvoyant equilibrium
price of firm i, pi∗, as t grows large. Note that a learning scheme in which the difference between pit and
pi∗ will eventually converge to zero is called complete learning; otherwise, it is termed incomplete learning.
In a competitive environment, it is not possible for a firm to achieve complete learning alone due to the
influence of strategies employed by competitors. Our synchronised pricing algorithm ensures that all firms
in the market jointly adjust their prices to achieve complete learning.
In an alternative scenario, in which some firms have knowledge of the demand function and the distri-
bution of demand shocks, such firms may be unwilling to engage in price experimentation. Therefore, we
propose a modified DDEP algorithm to account for this. In such cases, the approximate demand function
does not estimate the effects of firms with known demand, an idea originating from work by [8]. However, our
mechanism requires all that firms set prices simultaneously. As a result of the information asymmetry, the
pricing of firms with unknown demand will not be affected by the firms with the knowledge of the demand
curves; however, the pricing of the firms with the knowledge of the demand curves will be affected by firms
with unknown demand.
The process of learning is often evaluated in terms of regrets. In our setting, the definition of regret is
quite different from that which is commonly used in a monopoly setting in which a firm is playing against
the market demand (without competitors); see [3], [6]. In our study, a firm’s regret is described over a
time interval given by the difference between the realized revenue and optimal expected revenue, given that
other competitors stick to the pricing decisions determined by the pricing algorithm. We also analyze the
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revenue difference obtained by the algorithm from that obtained by the clairvoyant Nash equilibrium p∗ per
algorithm iteration, which are discussed in further detail in Section 2.3.
The main results of our work are as follows:
– The best response function derived by DDEP through the quadratic concave function will generate the
sequence {pt} that converges to p∗ as t grows large. (Theorem 1)
– As time progresses, the accumulated revenue of each firm generated by the pricing policies of DDEP
algorithm is asymptotically close to the clairvoyant accumulated revenue. (Theorem 3)
– The revenue difference converges to zero as time progresses and is related to the quantity of firms in
competition. The difference implies that realised revenues are sometimes greater than those revenues
obtained by the clairvoyant Nash equilibrium p∗. However, we are unable to predict when this will
occur. (Theorem 2)
– If some clairvoyant firms with knowledge of the demandprice relationship do not participate in price ex-
perimentation and those firms without knowledge of the demand functions use the partially-flawed linear
approximate demand functions (according to the definition in [8]), then the sequence {pt}, generated by
the modified DDEP may still converge to p∗. Furthermore, the convergence rate of regret among firms
without knowledge of the demand curve is related to the quantity of such firms, while the convergence
rate among firms with knowledge of the demand curve is not. (Theorem 5)
1.2 Related Work
To conclude this section, we briefly review the literature that is most related to our work.
– Learning algorithms for pricing models in a monopoly market. Dynamic pricing is a critical
tool for revenue management. The problem of unknown demand functions has been widely explored
in the literature. One common theme of the existing work focuses on the task firms face to arrive at
optimal pricing decisions when the underlying demand curve is unknown and how to lower the growth
rate of regret. [2] assumed that the demand function belongs to a known parametric family with unknown
parameter values and develop a non-parametric pricing policy that achieves asymptotic optimality. The
structure relies on price experimentation to infer accurate information about the demand function. Since
price experimentation can be costly, some papers focus on a balance between the explorationexploitation
trade-off. [5] used maximum-likelihood estimation to build the pricing policy and [4] proposed a policy
of gradually reducing the taboo interval to achieve asymptotically optimal pricing. The two policies that
they proposed can be regarded as iterated least squares. [13] provided a generally sufficient condition for
iterated least squares methods which ensures that regret does not exceed the order of
√
T . A common
feature of previous work is that the underlying demand model is assumed to be the same as the parametric
demand function and is thus well-specified. [3] proposed a pricing policy constructed on the assumption
that the underlying demand curve is non-linear but used a linear approximation to model the market
response to the offered price. We refer readers to [6] and [7] which extend the model to coordinate pricing
and an inventory control problem.
– Dynamic pricing in a competitive environment. Few papers consider dynamic pricing with com-
petition, as this type of problem requires a game-theoretic approach to obtain a solution. Some studies
consider non-cooperative competition in revenue management, where the products are differentiated, for
example, at the service-level or based on certain attributes of the goods on which consumer choice closely
depends. [15] presented a dynamic pricing model in which strategic consumers choose differentiated per-
ishable goods. With firms able to benefit from a lack of complete information among consumers, they
provide an analysis of the equilibrium price dynamic under different market settings. [10] also studied
how consumer choice depends not only on price, but also on purchase time and product attributes; they
showed that the shadow price solved by the deterministic problem can be used to construct an asymptotic
equilibrium pricing policy. When different companies sell identical goods, the market response depends
mainly on the price. [8] used a “flawed” demand function without incorporating competitor prices and
showed that (a) the prices converge to the Nash equilibrium if the slope is known to the seller, (b) the
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prices converge to the cooperative prices if the intercept is known to the seller, and (c) there are many
potential limit prices that are neither Nash equilibrium nor cooperative prices if the parameters of the
demand function are unknown.
– Learning algorithms for pricing models in a competitive environment. If the content of learning
is incorporated into the pricing policy, companies are able to learn the response of consumers and
competitors, continuously adjusting pricing to achieve optimality over time. [1] considered a myopic
pricing policy in a competitive oligopolistic environment. In such a case, a given firm must estimate
not only its own demand but also the demand and pricing of competitors. A method of mathematical
programming with equilibrium constraints is applied to formulate the model to estimate the competitor
parameters. [12] proposed further improvements that adjusted the most accurate parameters of demand
function periodically based on the equilibrium demands. [11] considered a firm selling a single product
with multiple versions and developed a multinomial logit choice demand model, commonly used in
the context of non-cooperative competition between firms selling differentiated goods, each seeking to
maximize total revenue. Bayesian updating is used to estimate the unknown arrival rate, and maximum
likelihood estimation is used to update the core value. They showed that the unknown parameters can
be estimated simultaneously while sales are changing. [14] used the observed sales data to estimate the
parameters of demand by Kalman filtering, showing that a differential variational inequality can be
used to model the non-cooperative competition. [9] conducted two field experiments with randomized
prices. The first experiment estimated a consumer choice model in which observations of sales made by
competitors are not required, and the second tested a best response pricing strategy.
2 Model and Preliminaries
We consider a periodical equilibrium pricing problem for N firms. In each period t = 1, · · · , T , each
firm needs to set prices pit, chosen from a feasible and bounded policy set P i =
[
pi,ℓ, pi,h
]
, pi,ℓ < pi,h,
∀i = 1, · · · , N . The prices set by firms affect the market response of all firms in the competition. Recall that
p ≡ (pi, p−i) denotes the vector of prices of all firms in the competition. The market response to the price pit
for firm i at time t (which is exactly the demand function) is given by Dit(pt) = λ
i(pt) + ε
i
t, ∀i = 1, · · · , N,
in which λi(pt) is a deterministic twice differentiable function representing the mean demand, conditional on
the price pt, and ε
i
t are zero-mean random variables, assumed to be independent and identically distributed.
Hence, the demand curve λi(p) of firm i not only depends on the price pi, chosen by itself, but also on
the prices of other firms p−i, where p−i =
{
p1, · · · , pi−1, pi+1, · · · , pN}. Let πi = (pi1, pi2, · · · ) denote the
sequence of pricing policy of firm i and Π = (π1, · · · , πN ) denote the admissible pricing policies of all firms.
The revenue function ri of firm i obtained from prices p is denoted by ri(p) ≡ piE[Di(p)]. Each firm seeks
to maximize its revenue in a competitive environment. Since the feasible strategy set of firm i depends on
the pricing strategies of competitors, the equilibrium prices of all firms are a generalised Nash equilibrium
(GNE). We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 For any pi ∈ P i,
(i)
∂λi(·, p−i)
∂pi
< 0, ∀i = 1, · · · , N ,
(ii)
∂λi(pi, p−i\j , ·)
∂pj
> 0, ∀j 6= i, i = 1, · · · , N ,
(iii)
∂2ri(p)
∂2p
, ∀i = 1, · · · , N is a negative semi-definite matrix.
Assumption (i) ensures that for every firm i, the underlying demand function λi(·, p−i) is strictly de-
creasing on pi given the prices set by other firms, p−i. Assumption (ii) dictates that λi(pi, p−i\j , ·) is strictly
increasing on pj with pi and p−i\j given, in which p−i\j represents the vector constituted by all prices except
pi and pj. Assumption (iii) dictates that the revenue function ri(p) is a concave function and there exists a
unique maximizer for any feasible p.
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For every firm i, if the underlying demand curve λi(·) and the distribution of the random error εi are
known a priori, the optimal pricing decision is obtained by solving the following revenue maximization
problem:
maximizepi,Di r
i(p) ≡ piE [Di(p)]
subject to E
[
Di(p)
] ≥ 0, pi ∈ P i, ∀i = 1, · · · , N (1)
A vector p ≡ (pi, p−i) is feasible for the GNE problem if it satisfies the constraint λi(p) ≥ 0 for all firms
i = 1, · · · , N . A feasible vector p∗ is a solution to the problem of GNE if, for all firms i = 1, · · · , N , we have
ri(pi∗, p−i∗) ≥ ri(pi, p−i∗) ∀pi : λi(pi, p−i∗) ≥ 0
It is well known that if there exists a vector p∗ and multipliers that satisfy the following KKT system for
each firm i: [
λi(p) + pi∇piλi(p) + E(εi)
]
+ µi,1
[∇piλi(p) ]− µi,2 + µi,3 = 0 ∀i
µi,1 ≥ 0, µi,1 · [λi(p) + E(εi)] = 0, λi(p) + E(εi) ≥ 0, ∀i
µi,2 ≥ 0, µi,2 · (pi,h − pi) = 0, pi,h − pi ≥ 0 ∀i
µi,3 ≥ 0, µi,3 · (pi − pi,l) = 0, pi − pi,l ≥ 0, ∀i,
(2)
then the vector p∗ is a GNE.
Due to the lack of information about the underlying demand curves, firms must collect enough obser-
vations to estimate the demand functions. We assume that only the offered prices pt are observed by all
competitors at time t and that every firm is aware of past sales data. To mitigate the negative effects arising
from not knowing the demand function, every firm is motivated to learn of it. Each firm completes the process
of learning on its own. The mechanism controls the learning process of all firms and guarantees that prices p
converge to the clairvoyant GNE p∗, which are the solutions to the above system in the case of clairvoyant
demand. We describe the learning process as complete learning if the gathered information is sufficient and
the price of each firm pit converges to p
i∗ in probability as t goes large. Under the mechanism, every firm
strictly follows a complete learning process. Otherwise, price pit would not converge to p
i∗, meaning that
the process constitutes incomplete learning. Complete learning is critical for the market to stabilise. Then,
this mechanism allows firms to share the estimators of the demand curve with each other to generate the
equilibrium price, and each firm reprices at the new equilibrium price.
2.1 Performance Measures
For each feasible pricing policy Π generated by the algorithm, we examine it in two ways. The first
method is to evaluate whether pˆn will converge to p
∗; the second is to measure the impacts of pˆt on each
firm i’s revenues. We quantify this impact as regret which is defined as
Ri(πi, T ) = E
[
T∑
t=1
ri(pi∗t , p
−i
t )
]
− E
[
T∑
t=1
ri(pit, p
−i
t )
]
(3)
We are most concerned with whether the average regret per period, Ri(π, T )/T converges to zero with an
acceptable convergence rate. The definition of regret in the monopoly setting is worse-case regret, which is
the revenue of a single firm generated by a given pricing policy compared to the optimal revenue generated
by the firm with the knowledge of the demand curve.
However, this definition is not suitable for our setting since revenues obtained at clairvoyant GNE p∗
are not optimal. Alternative pricing vectors p may exist that lead to higher revenues than those at p∗ when
firms search for an equilibrium point (see also in [8]). What should be emphasised here is that this situation,
in which price vectors are not Nash equilibrium points and incentives remain for firms to change their prices,
may happen when all firms engage in non-cooperative competition. Compared to the revenues obtained by
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the pricing policies Π , the revenues obtained by the clairvoyant Nash equilibrium may be higher or lower.
We define the revenue difference as
Di(πi, T ) =
∣∣∣∣∣E[
T∑
t=1
ri(pi∗, p−i∗)]− E[
T∑
t=1
ri(pit, p
−i
t )]
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣pi∗λi(p∗)T − E[
T∑
t=1
pitD
]
t
∣∣∣∣∣ (4)
to evaluate it. The revenue difference is positive in each period. As it is impossible to determine whether
revenues obtained by the clairvoyant Nash equilibrium are less than those obtained by the pricing policies
Π , the difference per period between the two is expressed as an absolute value no less than zero.
2.2 Algorithm
We propose a DDEP algorithm to solve the pricing decisions of each firm in competition. DDEP operates
in stages, which we index by n for n = 0, 1, 2, · · · . Every stage is equally separated as N + 1 time intervals,
which we index by m for m = 1, 2, · · · , N + 1, and each interval contains In periods (i.e., time steps). In
the beginning of stage n, firm i publishes a price pˆin, the vector of all prices is denoted as pˆn. As there
are (N + 1)In periods in one stage, the notation tn represents period t at the beginning of stage n. In
Step 1, firm i’s price pit = pˆ
i
n will not be changed in NIn but will be changed in 1 time interval if the
index m is equal to the firm index i. Therefore, all firms are required to adjust their prices sequentially and
collect sales information. Using the observations in stage n, the demand functions λi(·) of all firms are then
approximated by a simple linear function. At the end of stage n, all firms need to find the current GNE
pˆn+1 for the next stage, which is computed by an approximate demand function. Now, we present in detail
the DDEP algorithm looping n from 0 until a terminal stage, given as period T .
– Step 0. Preparation: If n = 0, input I0, v, and pˆ
i
1, ∀i = 1, · · · , N . If n > 0, set In = ⌊I0vn⌋ and δn = I−
1
4
n .
– Step 1: Setting prices. Loop m from 1 to N + 1. The rule of firm i’s price pit at time t is
if m 6= i,
pit = pˆ
i
n, ∀t = tn + 1, · · · , tn + iIn, tn + (i+ 1)In + 1, · · · , tn + (N + 1)In,
if m = i,
pit = pˆ
i
n + δn, ∀t = tn + iIn + 1, · · · , tn + (i+ 1)In.
End the m-loop. Set tn+1 = tn + (N + 1)In.
– Step 2. Estimating:
(αˆin+1, βˆ
ij
n+1) = arg min
αi,βij


t=tn+(N+1)In∑
t=tn+1

Dit −
(
αi − βiipit +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
βijpjt
)
2

 .
– Step 3. Computing the equilibrium: We define the following optimization problem for firm i:
max
pi
rin+1 ≡ max
pi
Gn+1
{
pi, p−i, αˆin+1, βˆ
ij
n+1
}
,
where Gn+1
{
pi, p−i, αˆin+1, βˆ
i
n+1
}
≡

pi

αˆin+1 − βˆiin+1pi + N∑
j=1,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p
j


∣∣∣∣∣∣αˆin+1 − βˆiin+1pi +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p
j ≥ 0, pi ∈ P i

 .
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Proceeding to solve the system:[
αˆin+1 − 2βˆiin+1pi +
N∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p
j
]
+ µi,1
[
−βˆin+1
]− µi,2 + µi,3 = 0 ∀i,
µi,1 ≥ 0, µi,1 ·

−αˆin+1 + βˆiin+1pi −
N∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p
j

 = 0, αˆin+1 − βˆiin+1pi +
N∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p
j ≥ 0 ∀i,
µi,2 ≥ 0, µi,2 · (pi − pi,h) = 0, pi,h − pi ≥ 0 ∀i,
µi,3 ≥ 0, µi,3 · (pi,l − pi) = 0, pi − pi,l ≥ 0 ∀i.
(5)
Then, prices for each firm pˆin+1 are set to the unique solution of this system. Set n = n+ 1 and return
to Step 0.
During the DDEP operation cycle in Step 1 to explore the sensitivity of the market to price changes,
each firm must adjust the price by adding δn. In Step 2, the underlying demand function of all firms is
estimated using linear regression. Note that we only use the data gathered in this stage since past data may
lead to inaccurate estimation of the demand function. If the underlying demand curve is a linear function,
we can use all the cumulative data for the estimation due to the unchanging market sensitivity provided
that price changes. However, as the underlying demand curve is not known a priori, market sensitivity may
keep changing as the prices change if the demand function is misspecified. In Step 3, the mechanism solves
the KKT system (5), which includes the revenue optimization problem of all firms, providing a way to
compute the equilibrium under the approximated demand. The solutions to system (5) will be used for the
next stage. The structure of operation cycles has been frequently utilized elsewhere in research on learning
and pricing problems. [3] proposed a pricing policy to learn the demand function and find optimal pricing
corresponding to the approximate demand function. DDEP is a generalization of their work, in which there
are no competitors (N = 1), so the number of periods needed for each stage reduces to be equal to the
number in their work. An important piece of later work is that of [6], which considers joint pricing and
inventory control with backlog, assuming that the underlying demand model is multiplicative. Their work
achieved minimal possible regret growth. In another paper, [7] considered the inventory problem with lost
sales in which the underlying demand model is assumed to be additive.
3 Analysis: Convergence, Revenue Difference, and Regret
Although a linear demand function suffices to estimate various underlying demand patterns in a monop-
olistic setting in [3], the goal of this paper is to investigate whether such a linear model remains suitable in a
competitive setting. To this end, we start by analysing the limit point of {pˆn} given its existence. We divide
the analyses into two parts: first, we argue by intuition that when the limit price exists and the noise is
absent, no unilateral changes on limit price p˜i will maximize the revenue function for an individual player i;
that is, limit price is exactly the clairvoyant GNE. Second, we argue that this statement remains true when
noise is present.
We formally show in Section 3.1 that the pricing decision of each firm will converge to the clairvoyant
GNE p∗ in probability if all firms accept the synchronized control. We find that the average regret defined
in (3) converges to zero and the convergence of difference defined in (4) is dependent on the number of
competitors. We discuss the revenue difference bound and a regret bound in Section 3.2.
Analysis for the Noiseless Case.
Lemma 1. Suppose that εit = 0, ∀i and t, and that the sequence {pˆn}, assuming nonzero demand and
that the price is away from the limits, generated by DDEP converges to a limit point p˜, which satisfies
p˜i = − λ
i(p˜)
∇piλi(p˜)
. Then, p˜ is exactly p∗.
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Proof. Without noise, the estimate of the coefficients has a closed-form expression in terms of the rate of
demand change with respect to the price increment δn:
βˆiin+1 = −
λi(pˆin + δn, pˆ
−i
n ; )− λi(pˆn)
δn
, ∀i, and (6)
βˆijn+1 =
λi(pˆjn + δn, pˆ
−j
n )− λi(pˆn)
δn
, ∀i, j, i 6= j, (7)
where λi(pˆjn + δn, pˆ
−j
n ) denotes the the demand faced by firm i at the price vector whose jth element is
pˆjn + δn and those of others are pˆ
−j
n . It can be inferred from the design of Step 2 in the algorithm that
αˆin+1 = λ
i(pˆn) + βˆ
ii
n+1pˆ
i
n −
N∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1pˆ
j
n, ∀i, (8)
and that the closed-form (unconstrained) maximizer of the revenue function is expressed as
pˆin+1 =
αˆin+1 +
N∑
j 6=i
βˆijn+1pˆ
j
n+1
2βˆiin+1
, ∀i. (9)
Suppose that the sequence {pˆn} converges to limit vector p˜. It must be, therefore, that the sequence {βˆiin }
converges to β˜ii and {βˆijn } converges to β˜ij , where
β˜ii = −∇piλi(p˜) and β˜ij = ∇pjλi(p˜).
Therefore, (8) implies that {αˆin} must converge to
α˜i = λi(p˜) +∇piλi(p˜)p˜i −
N∑
j 6=i
∇pjλi(p˜)p˜j .
Thus, p˜i must satisfy the following equation:
p˜i =
α˜i +
N∑
j 6=i
β˜ij p˜j
2β˜ii
=
p˜i
2
− λ
i(p˜)
2∇piλi(p˜)
.
The equation above is exactly the first order condition for firm i’s revenue maximization problem. In a
competitive environment, the best response function can be inferred by the first-order condition for each firms
revenue maximisation problem. Hence, p˜ must be the unique clairvoyant GNE p∗, which can be obtained
by solving the concatenated first-order conditions.
Intuitively, the statement in Lemma 1 still holds when the environment is noisy.
Analysis with Noise. In fact, noise εit always exists over the time horizon T . Hence,
βˆiin+1 = −
t=tn+(i+1)In∑
t=tn+iIn+1
(
λi(pˆin + δn, pˆ
−i
n ) + ε
i
t
)
−
t=tn+In∑
t=tn+1
(
λi(pˆn) + ε
i
t
)
Inδn
= −∇piλi(pˆn) +O(δn) +
1
δn
1
In

t=tn+(i+1)In∑
t=tn+iIn+1
εit −
t=tn+In∑
t=tn+1
εit

 , ∀i, and
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βˆijn+1 =
t=tn+(j+1)In∑
t=tn+jIn+1
(
λi(pˆjn + δn, pˆ
−j
n ) + ε
i
t
)
−
t=tn+In∑
t=tn+1
(
λi(pˆn) + ε
i
t
)
Inδn
= −∇pjλi(pˆn) +O(δn) +
1
δn
1
In

t=tn+(j+1)In∑
t=tn+jIn+1
εit −
t=tn+In∑
t=tn+1
εit

, ∀i, j,
where O(δn) denotes the quantity that is, at most, some constant multiplied by δn. Derived using Hoeffdings
inequality (formally in Appendix B), an exponential bound shows that
I−1n

t=tn+(i+1)In∑
t=tn+iIn+1
εit −
t=tn+In∑
t=tn+1
εit

 and I−1n

t=tn+(j+1)In∑
t=tn+jIn+1
εit −
t=tn+In∑
t=tn+1
εit


may be bounded above by a factor of (log(In)/In)
1/2 with high probability. As n grows, δn and thus
δ−1n (log(In)/In)
1/2 converge to zero (proved formally in Proposition 3), then
βˆiin+1 ≈ −∇piλi(pˆn) and βˆijn+1 ≈ ∇pjλi(pˆn).
In particular, when explicitly accounting for noise, the arguments above ensure that the effects of noise
vanish as n increases and that the fitted linear model can serve as an estimation of the underlying demand
model without being affected by N .
However, we show later that when facing competition, the upper bound of revenue regret, derived in the
same way as that of one firm, is scaled by N (i.e., Theorem 3), the upper bound of revenue difference is
scaled by N2 (i.e., Theorem 2), and the deviation between the best responses and the clairvoyant GNE price
is upper bounded by a factor of N2I
− 12
n (i.e., Inequality (11)).
3.1 Convergence
We clarify that pˆn+1 generated by DDEP is obtained by the KKT system (5) while the clairvoyant GNE
p∗ is obtained by (2). We introduce an operator zi
(
α˘i(p), β˘ii(p), β˘ij(p)
)
that represents the best response
of firm i when there is no estimation error, and we write firm i’s revenue as
ri = pi

α˘i(p)− β˘ii(p)pi + N∑
j=1,j 6=i
β˘ij(p)pj

 ,
where
α˘i(p) = λi(p)−∇piλi(p)pi +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∇pjλi(p)pj and β˘ij(p) =
N∑
j=1
∇pjλi(p)pj .
Let z(p) =
(
zi
(
α˘i(p), β˘ii(p), β˘ij(p)
))N
i
be the collection of best responses of all firms. We state some
assumptions associated with our main results.
Assumption 2 1. For every zi, we have max
pi∈Pi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
dzi
(
α˘i(p), β˘ii(p), β˘ij(p)
)
dpi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 1 .
2. For every firm i, the variance of each firm’s εi is equal to σ2.
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The first part of the above assumption ensures that zi
(
α˘i(p), β˘ii(p), β˘ij(p)
)
constitutes a contraction map-
ping, and thus there exists a unique fixed point. We observe that pi∗ is the fixed point of
zi
(
α˘i(pi, p−i∗), β˘ii(pi, p−i∗), β˘ij(pi, p−i∗)
)
, implying that zi
(
α˘i(pi, p−i∗), β˘ii(pi, p−i∗), β˘ij(pi, p−i∗)
)
= pi∗ =
z¯i(pi, p−i∗), where z¯i(pit, p
−i
t ) denotes the best response of firm i when when its competitors set price p
−i
t at
time t. We need the second part of the assumption, the homogeneity of variance, to ease our analysis. Hence,
we make the following proposition.
Proposition 1
If pi∗ = zi
(
α˘i(pi, p−i∗), β˘ii(pi, p−i∗), β˘ij(pi, p−i∗)
)
, then there exists a constant γ ∈ (0, 1) such that
‖p∗ − z(pˆn)‖ ≤ γ ‖p∗ − pˆn‖ .
Proposition 1 is based on a deterministic (mean) demand function, and the convergence result follows
directly from the property of a contraction mapping. Now, we focus on a randomized demand function and
we aim to establish the convergence result as follows.
Theorem 1
Under Assumptions, the GNE, pˆn converges in probability to p
∗ as n→∞.
Theorem 1 states that the prices generated by our algorithm DDEP converge in probability to GNE
p∗, which is the solution that satisfies the KKT system (2). The principle technique for establishing the
convergence of price in probability is described below. Let the price vector pˆn+1 be the solution of the KKT
system (5), which means that pˆn+1 is the Nash equilibrium. Fix pˆ
−i
n+1 and let C
i
n denote the difference between
zi
(
α˘i(pi, pˆ−in+1), β˘
ii(pi, pˆ−in+1), β˘
ij(pi, pˆ−in+1)
)
and zi
(
αˆin+1, βˆ
ii
n+1, βˆ
ij
n+1
)
, in which the former one represents
the best response of firm i to maximize the following revenue function
rin+1 = p
i

α˘i(pi, pˆ−in+1)− β˘ii(pi, pˆ−in+1)pi +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
β˘ij(pˆn+1)pˆ
j
n+1

.
While the latter represents the best response of firm i seeking to maximize a second format of revenue
function, utilizing fitted rather than the revealed demand is different from the real revenue,
rin+1 = p
i

αˆin+1 − βˆiin+1pi + N∑
j=1,j 6=i
βˆijn+1pˆ
j
n+1

 .
As shown, pˆin+1 is the fixed point of z
i
(
αˆin+1, βˆ
ii
n+1, βˆ
ij
n+1
)
obtained when other players fix prices as pˆ−in+1.
We present the following proposition:
Proposition 2
For any given pˆin ∈ P i generated by DDEP, with high probabilitya the following inequality holds
‖z(pˆn)− pˆn+1‖ ≤ ‖Cn‖,
where Cn ≡
[
C1n, · · · , CNn
]
is a vector of constants.
a The probability lower bound is specified in the proof of Proposition 3.
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Proposition 2, which is proved in Appendix A, shows that the difference between these best response
functions is bounded with high probability. Note that z(pˆn) denotes the collection of all firms’ best responses
zi
(
α˘i(pˆn), β˘
ii(pˆn), β˘
ij(pˆn)
)
. The inequality in Proposition 2 may not hold because it is reliant on a good
event-that the demand shocks εt do not cause poor estimation of the parameters. Note that if one firm is
unable to make a sufficiently good estimation, other firms will be affected. The effect of price experimentation,
in which adding δn affects the demand of all participants, should gradually vanish over time. Otherwise, it
will cause a poor estimation of the parameters even if demand shocks do not exist.
Broadly speaking, the argument above, together with Proposition 1 provides a constructive way to design
effective price experimentation to obtain pricing convergence. The next proposition gives an upper bound
for the expectation of the difference between the two best response functions in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3
At stage n, for some suitable constant K1, the operator z(pˆn) and the DDEP generated pˆn+1 satisfy
E
[‖z(pˆn)− pˆn+1‖2] ≤ N2K1I− 12n .
Proposition 3, proven in Appendix B, also provides an upper bound for the deviation between z(pˆn) and
pˆn+1. The upper bound is related to the squared number of competitive firms, N
2, and converges to zero as
the number of stages increases.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1). We obtain an upper bound of E[(pˆn+1 − p∗)2], a result that has been proved
previously. Combining the results in Propositions 13, it follows that
E
[‖pˆn+1 − p∗‖2]
≤ E
[
(‖p∗ − z(pˆn)‖+ ‖z(pˆn)− pˆn+1‖)2
]
≤ E
[
(γ‖p∗ − pˆn‖+ ‖z(pˆn)− pˆn+1‖)2
]
≤
(
1 + γ2
2
)
E
[‖p∗ − pˆn‖2] +K2E [‖z(pˆn)− pˆn+1‖2]
≤
(
1 + γ2
2
)
E
[‖p∗ − pˆn‖2] +N2K3I− 12n . (10)
The first inequality uses the triangle inequality. The second inequality is from Proposition 1 with the constant
γ ∈ (0, 1). Note that
(√
2γ
1− γ2E
[‖z(pˆn)− pˆn+1‖2]−
√
1− γ2
2γ
E [‖pˆn − p∗‖]
)2
≥ 0, and
2E [‖pˆn − p∗‖]E [‖z(pˆn)− pˆn+1‖] ≤ 2γ
1− γ2E
[‖z(pˆn)− pˆn+1‖2]+ 1− γ2
2γ
E
[‖pˆn − p∗‖2] .
Hence, the third inequality is obtained:
E
[‖pˆn+1 − p∗‖2] ≤ 1 + γ2
2
E
[‖pˆn − p∗‖2]+K2E [‖z(pˆn)− pˆn+1‖2] .
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Selecting some appropriate constant K3 and combining it with the results in Proposition 3, we obtain the
last inequality. Let η = 1+γ
2
2 , and we obtain that
E
[‖pˆn+1 − p∗‖2] ≤ ηn‖p1 − p∗‖2 +N2K3 n−1∑
h=0
ηhI
− 12
n−h
≤ ηn‖p1 − p∗‖2 +N2K3
n∑
h=0
ηhI
− 12
n−h
≤ N2K4(v− 12 )n
n∑
h=0
ηhvh,
where v is selected to satisfy ηv
1
2 < 1 and there exists some appropriate K5, such that
E
[‖pˆn+1 − p∗‖2] ≤ N2K5I− 12n . (11)
Since η < 1 and I
− 12
n → 0 as n→∞, E
[‖pˆn+1 − p∗‖2]→ 0.
The convergence implies that if N is considered fixed, as n→∞, the difference of pˆn+1 and p∗ will tend
to zero. Hence, we demonstrate that the generalized equilibrium price will converge to the clairvoyant GNE
p∗ in probability.
3.2 Revenue Difference and Regret
Theorem 1 provides the asymptotically equilibrium result for the equilibrium pricing problem: under the
designed mechanism, it suffices to show that the linear model guarantees convergence to clairvoyant GNE
p∗. This result offers a fundamental basis for the following analysis. We first analyze the revenue difference,
as it may yield useful insights into regret analysis. Recall that the revenue difference denotes the difference
in the revenue obtained when all firms set the price to p∗ and that obtained when the price is set at pt.
Theorem 2: Revenue Difference
Under Assumptions, the sequence of the generalized Nash equilibrium {pˆt : t ≥ 1} satisfies
E
[
T∑
t=1
[ ∣∣ri(pi∗, p−i∗)− ri(pit, p−it )∣∣ ]
]
≤ N2K6T 12 , ∀i = 1, · · · , N,
for some positive constant K6, T ≥ 2, and N ≥ 2.
Theorem 2, whose proof is in Appendix C, implies that by using this pricing policy, even if the underlying
demand function is unknown, the difference between the revenue ri(pi∗, p−i∗) at the clairvoyant p∗ and the
revenue ri(pit, p
−i
t ) at pt obtained by DDEP is at most N
2K6T
1
2 , in which N represents the number of
participating firms. In other words, the revenue difference per period converges to zero. When N equals to
1, meaning there are no competitors in the market, the upper bound is O(T 1/2).
The common approach in regret analysis in a monopolistic setting, such as that of [3], [7] and [6], involves
a Taylor expansion to let the revenue function ri(pit, p
−i
t ) be approximated at p
∗; that is,
ri(pit, p
−i
t ) = r
i(pi∗, p−i∗) +∇ri(pi∗, p−i∗)T (p∗ − p)
+
1
2
(p∗ − pt)T∇2ri(pi∗, p−i∗)(p∗ − pt).
Suppose that no competitors exist and the term ∇ri(pi∗) is equal to zero, then regret can be expressed
as ∇2ri(pi∗)|pi∗ − pit|2 and the upper bound can be inferred by the result of (11). However, as the term
12
∇ri(pi∗, p−i∗) is a vector and not equal to zero in our setting, the traditional approach is not suitable for our
analysis. It is possible that certain price vectors may yield a higher revenue than Nash equilibrium prices.
Despite this, we can prove the same result using the negative semi-definiteness property of the revenue
function.
Theorem 2 gives us an upper bound on revenue difference, and we now analyze the revenue regret. It is
known that the price pit of firm i made by DDEP is not necessarily the optimal price that truly maximize i’s
own revenue. Such a true optimal price pi∗t is derived from the true best response function with respect to
the true demand. Suppose firm i realizes the true demand function at some time T . In such a case, the firm
will regret making the price decision at pit rather than p
i∗
t during the past time interval t = 1, . . . , T . Hence,
we obtain the following theory concerning the regret bound:
Theorem 3: Regret
Under the defined assumptions, the sequence of optimal decisions {pi∗t : t ≥ 1} satisfies
E
[
T∑
t=1
[
ri(pi∗t , p
−i
t )− ri(pit, p−it )
]]
≤ K7NT 12 , ∀i = 1, · · · , N,
for some positive constant K7, T ≥ 2 and N ≥ 2.
Theorem 3 shows that after time T , the revenue gap (regret) between making pricing at pit and making
pricing at pi∗t is at most NK7T
1
2 , which is also contingent on the number of firms. The revenue differences
have a worse bound than those obtained based on the regret of a single firm. There are two major underlying
reasons for this. First, the Taylor expansion of the revenue functions is different in the analysis of these two
cases. In this case, the Taylor expansion allows the revenue function to be approximated at pi∗t which is the
optimal pricing at time t, when the price of other firms p−it is fixed. The regret bound can be expressed
as 12∇2ri(pi∗t , p−it )|pi∗t − pit|2 while the revenue difference bound is 12∇2ri(pi∗t , p−i∗t )‖p∗ − pt‖2. Hence, the
difference between convergence rates of pt to p
i∗
t and p
∗ to pt causes the results to differ. Second, the revenue
used to compute a revenue difference with the algorithm relies on the revenue obtained at a clairvoyant GNE
p∗. The revenue used to compute regret is the revenue obtained at pi∗t which is the true revenue maximizer
at time t. The optimal pricing pi∗t is virtual and is therefore not useful in capturing sales information. Thus,
firm i cannot predict the subsequent pricing of other firms and, moreover, the convergence of pt to p
i∗
t is
unrelated to the convergence of p−it to p
−i∗
t . In fact, when p
i∗
t no longer changes, it means that p
i∗
t becomes
a fixed point of the best response function, zi, indicating that pricing decisions have reached the clairvoyant
GNE p∗.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). Fix a time horizon T , and firm i, and let k = inf
{
h ≥ 1 : (N + 1)
h∑
i=1
In ≥ T
}
.
The regret after T periods is given by
Ri = E
[
T∑
t=1
[
ri(pi∗t , p
−i
t )− ri(pit, p−it )
]]
.
Note that price set by other firms p−it is not changable in the definition of regret. Let the revenue function
ri(pit, p
−i
t ) be approximated at p
i∗
t ; hence,
ri(pi, p−i) = ri(pi∗t , p
−i
t ) +∇piri(pi∗t , p−it )(pi∗t − pit) +
1
2
∇2piri(pi∗, p−it )(pi∗t − pit)2
= ri(pi∗t , p
−i
t ) +
1
2
∇2piri(pi∗, p−it )(pi∗t − pit)2.
Since pi∗t is the optimal solution at time t, the term ∇piri(pi∗t , p−it ) is equal to zero. It should be emphasized
that pi∗t is the fixed point of z
i
(
α˘(pi∗t , p
−i
t ), β˘(p
i∗
t , p
−i
t )
)
since pˆ−it is considered fixed. According to Lemma 1,
13
we have
pi∗t = −
λi(pi∗t , p
−i
t )
∇piλi(pi∗t , p−it )
=
α˘(pi∗t , p
−i
t ) +
N∑
j,j 6=i
β˘ij(pi∗t , pˆ
−i
t )p
j
t
2β˘ii(pi∗t , p
−i
t )
where α˘(pi∗t , p
−i
t ) = λ
i(pi∗t , p
−i
t ) +∇piλi(pi∗t , p−it )pi∗t −
N∑
j,j 6=i
∇pjλi(pi∗t , p−it )pjt , β˘ij(pi∗t , p−it ) = ∇pjλi(pi∗t , p−it )
and β˘ii(pi∗t , p
−i
t ) = ∇piλi(pi∗t , p−it ). We divide the price experimentation in Step 1 into three parts and analyze
the regret separately. First, in the first In periods, there is no adjustment of price. For t = tn+1, · · · , tn+In,
we have that pt = pˆn; thus
∣∣pi∗t − pit∣∣ = ∣∣∣zi(α˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ), β˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ))− zi(αˆ(pˆn), βˆ(pˆn))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣pi∗t − zi(α˘(pˆn), β˘(pˆn))∣∣∣+ Cin = Cin, (12)
where Cin can be derived from (19). Second, in the periods when the firm i has changed its price, the
optimal price is the same as the previous one, as competitors do not change their strategies. For all t =
tn + iIn + 1, · · · , tn + (i+ 1)In, we have that pt = (pˆin + δn, pˆ−in ). Similar arguments show
∣∣pi∗t − pit∣∣ = ∣∣∣zi(α˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ), β˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ))− zi(αˆ(pˆin, pˆ−in ), βˆ(pˆin, pˆ−in ))− δn∣∣∣ = Cin + δn. (13)
Third, there are the periods when the other firms, except firm i, change their prices. Suppose that firm j
has also adjusted its price, for all t = tn + jIn +1, · · · , tn + (j +1)In, we have that pt = (pˆjn + δn, pˆ−jn ), and
it follows that
∣∣pi∗t − pit∣∣ = ∣∣∣zi(α˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ), β˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ))− zi(αˆ(pˆn), βˆ(pˆn))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣zi(α˘(pi∗t , pˆ−i\jn , pˆjn + δn), β˘(pi∗t , pˆ−i\jn , pˆjn + δn))− zi(αˆ(pˆn), βˆ(pˆn))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣zipjδn + zi(α˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ), β˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ))− zi(αˆ(pˆn), βˆ(pˆn))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣zipjδn + pi∗t − zi(α˘(pˆn), β˘(pˆn))∣∣∣+ Cin = Cin +K44δn, ∀j. (14)
As discussed in the proof of Theorem 1, value of Cin is divisible into two situations: good and bad. However,
there is no need to consider the possibility of a good event for all firms since the prices p−it cannot change.
The optimal pricing pi∗t cannot be used to capture sales information,opportunity to predict the optimal
pricing of other firms. Combining the results of (12)-(14) gives the following:
E
[∥∥pi∗t − pˆit∥∥2] = ∣∣∣zi(α˘(pi∗t , pˆ−it ), β˘(pi∗t , pˆ−it ))− zi(αˆ(pt), βˆ(pt))∣∣∣2 = NK45I− 12n .
14
Fixed a time horizon T and considering i, while letting k = inf
{
h ≥ 1 : (N + 1)
h∑
i=1
In ≥ T
}
, and satisfy
logv
(
v−1
(N+1)I0v
T + 1
)
≤ k < logv
(
v−1
(N+1)I0v
T + 1
)
+ 1, we obtain that
Ri ≤ E
[
T∑
t=1
( [
ri(pi∗n , pˆ
−i
n )− ri(pˆin, pˆ−in )
]
+
[
ri(pi∗n , pˆ
−i
n )− ri(pˆin, pˆ1n + δn, pˆ−i,−i6=1n )
]
+ · · ·+ [ri(pi∗n , pˆ−in )− ri(pˆin, pˆNn + δn, pˆ−i,−i6=Nn )] )In
]
≤ K46
k∑
n=1
(
(N + 1)E
∥∥pi∗n , pˆ−in ∥∥2 +Nδ2n) In
≤ NK7T 12 .
4 Partially-Clairvoyant Model and Results
Given the results above, a question arises as to whether the regret and difference bounds still hold when
some firms have knowledge of the underlying demand curves λi(·) and the distributions of demand shocks
εi.
[8] considered a linear model in which decision makers ignore the impact of competitors, that is, the
flawed model αi − βiipi in which the prices of the other firms do not appear in an estimated demand curve.
An important property in their work is the demand consistency property. They considered a limit point p˜
which is the clairvoyant GNE and assumed that all firms use these flawed estimated demand curves. The
estimated demand and the expected demand at p˜ are equal, that is, αi − βip˜i∗ = E[Di(p˜)]. However, using
this kind of flawed model may lead the firms to converge to some potential limit points that are not Nash
equilibria. Thus, the flawed estimated demand curves cannot be used directly for our purpose.
Suppose that N ′ firms do not know the demand curve. We thus define the partially-flawed estimated
demand curves under the partially-clairvoyant model for the firms without the knowledge of underlying
demand curves as
αi − βiipi +
N ′∑
j=1,j 6=i
βijpj ,
in which the effects of the firms with the knowledge of underlying demand curves do not appear in this model.
We justify the choice of such partially-flawed estimated demand curves in the following. If the firms without
the knowledge of demand curves use the full estimated demand curves, the number of price combinations in
one stage should be (N +1) to determine the values of N +1 unknown parameters. However, the clairvoyant
firms have no need to estimate the demand curves and are not motivated to attend the price experimentation
which may lead to lower revenues for them. The price experimentation can only consist of (N ′ + 1) prices
combinations. If the firms without the knowledge of demand curves considered the full estimated demand
curves while the clairvoyant firms do not attend the price experimentation, the result of experimentation
would be under-determined equations and might result in inaccurate parameters estimation. In addition,
in order to ensure the convergence of the parameters, we also require the firms without the knowledge of
underlying demand curves to adjust their prices (by adding δn) and set equilibrium prices synchronously.
N ′ firms accept the mechanism to perform price experimentation. The modified Step 1 in DDEP dictates
that price experimentation now only involves N ′ firms while Step 3 remains the same. The index k represents
the firms with known demand, k = N ′ + 1, · · · , N . In each iteration, N ′ firms keep learning the demand
function and N firms compute the equilibrium simultaneously. The modified DDEP procedure is given as
follows:
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– Step 0. Preparation: If n = 0, input I0, v, and pˆ
i
1, ∀i = 1, · · · , N ′, ∀k = N ′ + 1, · · · , N . If n > 0, set
In = ⌊I0vn⌋ and δn = I−
1
4
n .
– Step 1. Setting prices: Firm k’s pricing pkt , for k = N
′ + 1, · · · , N , is:
pkt = pˆ
k
n ∀t = tn + 1, · · · , tn + (N ′ + 1)In.
Loop m from 1 to N ′ + 1. The rule of firm i’s pricing pit at time t is :
if m 6= i,
pit = pˆ
i
n, ∀t = tn + 1, · · · , tn + iIn, tn + (i+ 1)In + 1, · · · , tn + (N ′ + 1)In,
if m = i,
pit = pˆ
i
n + δn, ∀t = tn + iIn + 1, · · · , tn + (i+ 1)In.
End the m-loop. Set tn+1 = tn + (N
′ + 1)In.
– Step 2. Estimating:
(
αˆin+1, βˆ
ij
n+1
)
= arg min
αi,βij


t=tn+(N
′+1)In∑
t=tn+1

Dit −

αi − βiipit + N
′∑
j=1,j 6=i
βijpjt




2

 .
– Step 3. Computing the equilibrium: We define the optimization problem for firm i as follows:
max
pi
rin+1 ≡ max
pi
Gn+1
{
pi, p−i, αˆin+1, βˆ
ij
n+1
}
where Gn+1
{
pi, p−i, αˆin+1, βˆ
i
n+1
}
≡

pin

αˆin+1 − βˆiin+1pin +
N ′∑
j=1,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p
j
n


∣∣∣∣∣∣αˆin+1 − βˆiin+1pin +
N ′∑
j=1,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p
j
n ≥ 0, pi ∈ P i

 .
Solve the following two systems simultaneously:
 αˆin+1 − 2βˆiin+1pi + N
′∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p
j

+ µi,1 [−βˆin+1 ]− µi,2 + µi,3 = 0, ∀i,
µi,1 ≥ 0, µi,1 ·
(
−αˆin+1 + βˆiin+1pi −
N ′∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p
j
)
= 0, ∀i,
−αˆin+1 + βˆiin+1pin −
N ′∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p
j ≤ 0, ∀i,
µi,2 ≥ 0, µi,2 · (pi − pi,h) = 0, pi − pi,h ≤ 0 ∀i,
µi,3 ≥ 0, µi,3 · (pi,l − pi) = 0, pi,l − pi ≤ 0 ∀i,
(15)
and
[λk(p) + pk∇pkλk(p) + E(εk) ] + µk,1[∇pkλk(p) ]− µk,2 + µk,3 = 0 ∀k,
µk,1 ≥ 0, µk,1 · (−λk(p)− E(εk)) = 0,−λk(p) − E(εk) ≤ 0, ∀k,
µk,2 ≥ 0, µk,2 · (pk − pk,h) = 0, pk − pk,h ≤ 0 ∀k,
µk,3 ≥ 0, µk,3 · (pk,l − pk) = 0, pk,l − pk ≤ 0 ∀k.
(16)
Then, the prices for each firm pˆin+1 and pˆ
k
n+1 are set to the unique solution of the above simultaneous
equations (15) and (16). Set n := n+ 1 and return to Step 0.
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4.1 Analyses
In the above algorithm, the linear model is different from that described in Section 2. We adjust it
according to the number of firms participating in price experimentation. The mechanism requires that firms
with knowledge of the demand functions modify prices simultaneously; this is important for those firms
lacking knowledge of the demand functions. There are other major changes in Step 3, although the equilibrium
price is calculated simultaneously. The prices of the clairvoyant firms would have no influence on the pricing
decisions of the firms without knowledge of the demand functions while the latter’s pricing decisions affect
the former’s. Similar to Lemma 1, we show that the linear function
αi − βiipi +
N ′∑
j=1,j 6=i
βijpj
is sufficient for our learning. An analogy of Lemma 1 in this partially-clairvoyant setting is as follows:
Lemma 2. Suppose that εit = 0, ∀i = 1, · · · , N ′ and t, and that the sequence {pˆn} generated by DDEP
converges to a limit point p˜, which satisfies p˜i = − λ
i(p˜)
∇p˜iλi(p˜)
. Then, p˜ is exactly p∗.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we apply simple variation in this scenario. The proof only focuses
on the case where εi = 0. Parameters βˆiin+1 and βˆ
ij
n+1 can be derived in the same way; however, αˆ
i
n+1 has
changed. It therefore follows that
αˆin+1 = λ
i(pˆn) + βˆ
ii
n+1pˆ
i
n −
N ′∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1pˆ
j
n, ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N ′, (17)
pˆin+1 =
αˆin+1 +
N ′∑
j 6=i
βˆijn+1
2βˆiin+1
, ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N ′. (18)
As shown, pˆn+1 remains the same. The rest of the proof is same as that of Lemma 1.
Let us briefly explore the characteristics of the flawed linear model in [8]. Unlike our previous linear model
in Section 2, the impact of prices representing other competitors will not be fully expressed as the impact
of firms with known demand functions is omitted. At stage n, firm i, i = 1, ..., N ′ needs to participate in a
price experimentation to learn the demand function, while firm k, k = N ′ + 1, ·, N does not need to. This
means that the parameters βik cannot be estimated correctly. For firm i, totally unaware of firm k’s price,
the demand response from firm k is captured by the parameter αi. Firm k has a known demand function
and is still very sensitive to price changes by competitors. To better distinguish our models from the flawed
model of [8], we define the partially-flawed estimated demand curve as αi−βiipi+
N ′∑
j,j 6=i
βijpj . From the best
response function perspective, pˆin+1 is set by
argmax pi

αˆin+1 − βˆiin+1pi + N
′∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1pˆ
j
n+1


at the end of stage n. Compared with the previous arguments in Section 3.1, the main difference is the
parameter αˆin+1 in both models. Hence, during the estimation cycle, an obvious result can be used to
describe the difference between them, namely
N∑
k=N ′+1
∇pkλi(p)pk. Therefore, as the previous convergence
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result naturally applies to this model, we turn our attention to regret analysis. To demonstrate the influence
of the firms with knowledge of the underlying demand functions, we show the following results.
Theorem 4
Under the previously stated assumptions, suppose N ′ firms do not know the underlying demand
function, the sequence of the GNE {pt : t ≥ 1} converges to p∗, and satisfies
E
[
T∑
t=1
[
ri(pi∗t , p
−i∗
t )− ri(pit, p−it )
]]
≤ N ′2K8T 12 , ∀i = 1, · · · , N ′,
for some positive constant K8, T ≥ 2 and N ≥ 2, 1 ≤ N ′ ≤ N .
The aggregate difference over T periods between the revenues ri(p
i∗
t , p
−i∗
t ) and ri(p
i
t, p
−i
t ) is at most
N ′2K8T
1
2 . Comparing this to the results contained in Theorem 2, one apparent difference is that N2 changes
intoN ′2, which implies that the revenue difference is dependent on the number of the firms without knowledge
of the demand curve. The upper bound of this difference is applicable to any firms, including those that do
and do not know the underlying demand function. It stands to reason that if one firm does not know the
demand function, it must expend effort to learn the demand function and so the equilibrium will gradually
converge to the clairvoyant GNE p∗. If one firm does not reach the GNE p∗, there is no way for all firms to
stabilize pricing. Similar to the results in Theorem 3, we derive a further theorem.
Theorem 5
Under the previously stated assumptions, the sequence of optimal decisions
{
pi∗t : t ≥ 1
}
of the firms
who do not know the demand curve satisfies
E
[
T∑
t=1
[
ri(pi∗t , p
−i
t )− ri(pit, p−it )
]]
≤ N ′K9T 12 , ∀i = 1, · · · , N ′,
for some positive constant K9, T ≥ 2 and N ≥ 2, 1 ≤ N ′ ≤ N .
The sequence of optimal decisions
{
pi∗t : t ≥ 1
}
of the firms who know the demand curve satisfies
E
[
T∑
t=1
[
ri(pi∗t , p
−i
t )− ri(pit, p−it )
]]
≤ K10T 12 , ∀i = N ′ + 1, · · · , N,
for some positive constant K10, T ≥ 2 and N ≥ 2, 1 ≤ N ′ ≤ N .
It should be emphasized that the two kinds of firms have different regret bounds as shown in Theorem 5.
The price decisions of the clairvoyant firms always follows the best responses according to the true demand
curves, and there is no estimation error to affect the pricing decisions. However, their pricing decisions cannot
affect firms without knowledge of the demand curves. Theorem 5 shows that the upper bound on the regret
for firms without knowledge of the demand curves is still associated with the number of those firms while
the upper bound on the regret for the clairvoyant firms is not.
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5 Numerical Experiments
We examine the performance of the DDEP algorithm and present the numerical results related to regret.
We assume that the underlying demand curve is multinomial logit:
expα
i−βipi
1 +
N∑
i=1
expαi−βipi
, αi ∈ [αi, α¯i], βi ∈ [βi, β¯i],
where [αi, α¯i] = [3, 4] and [βi, β¯i] = [0.4, 0.5] for each firm i = 1, · · · , N . The random error of εit is assumed
to follow a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2. Owing to the properties of the multinomial
logit model, each firms demand does not exceed 1. Moreover, as the number of firms increases, setting the
standard deviation at a fixed value will lead to unrealistic experimental settings. Hence, we set the standard
deviation as the ratio (κ) of the average demand (λ¯) of all firms, i.e., σ = κ · λ¯, and it will vary with the
number of firms participating in price experimentation.
For the above specifications, we randomly select 100 combinations of the parameters αi and βi under
the uniform distributions for each firm i, i = 1, · · · , N . Each combination provides the parameters for the
underlying demand curve of all firms. In all experiments, we set an initial batch size I0 = N + 1 and
price interval P i = [pi,l, pi,h] = [0, 6]. The initial price pˆi1 is also randomly selected from P i, for each firm
i = 1, · · · , N . To present the result of the convergence of regret, for each period we compute the fraction of
optimal revenue as follows:
T∑
t=1
pitD
i
t
T∑
t=1
pi∗t λ
i(pi∗t , p
−i
t )
.
We test the performance of DDEP with different numbers of firms (N = 2, 3, 4, 5) and the value of v is set
at 2. Table 1 summarizes the results for the convergence of regret.
Table 1. The performance of DDEP in terms of the fraction of optimal revenue
Period (κ = 5%) Period (κ = 10%) Period (κ = 15%)
N=2 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
firm 1 0.9442 0.9905 0.9978 0.9005 0.9718 0.9925 0.7975 0.9289 0.9814
firm 2 0.9419 0.9891 0.9974 0.9159 0.9765 0.9926 0.8130 0.9410 0.9815
N=3 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
firm 1 0.8941 0.9880 0.9929 0.8527 0.9563 0.9885 0.7957 0.9103 0.9740
firm 2 0.8995 0.9832 0.9973 0.8497 0.9671 0.9877 0.8023 0.9007 0.9818
firm 3 0.8964 0.9727 0.9948 0.8600 0.9412 0.9856 0.8018 0.9091 0.9796
N=4 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
firm 1 0.8489 0.9703 0.9948 0.8279 0.9354 0.9874 0.8004 0.9134 0.9779
firm 2 0.8878 0.9779 0.9957 0.8144 0.9444 0.9900 0.7893 0.9003 0.9727
firm 3 0.8824 0.9733 0.9957 0.8324 0.9431 0.9887 0.7812 0.9072 0.9751
firm 4 0.8562 0.9701 0.9952 0.8129 0.9453 0.9888 0.8049 0.9054 0.9745
N=5 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
firm 1 0.8284 0.9618 0.9939 0.7978 0.9179 0.9824 0.8032 0.8805 0.9600
firm 2 0.8491 0.9631 0.9938 0.7855 0.9151 0.9816 0.8094 0.8783 0.9551
firm 3 0.8527 0.9616 0.9936 0.8009 0.9211 0.9840 0.7956 0.8587 0.9650
firm 4 0.8179 0.9542 0.9928 0.7985 0.9179 0.9828 0.8186 0.8964 0.9647
firm 5 0.8386 0.9623 0.9936 0.8053 0.9116 0.9835 0.7826 0.8799 0.9624
In Table 1, as the number of firms increases, the fraction of the optimal revenues grows significantly.
Additionally, as the demand shocks become larger, the fraction is reduced.
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For the partially-clairvoyant model, we let I0 = N
′ + 1 to test the performance of the modified DDEP
with different numbers of firms (N = 3, 4, 5).
Table 2. The performance of the modified DDEP in terms of the fraction of optimal revenue
Period (κ = 5%) Period (κ = 10%) Period (κ = 15%)
N=3, N ′ = 2 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
firm 1∗ 0.9655 0.9964 0.9996 0.9676 0.9970 0.9996 0.9593 0.9954 0.9997
firm 2 0.9229 0.9862 0.9971 0.9164 0.9732 0.9938 0.8775 0.9495 0.9867
firm 3 0.9421 0.9885 0.9971 0.9159 0.9762 0.9941 0.9014 0.9596 0.9881
N=4, N ′ = 3 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
firm 1∗ 0.9412 0.9943 0.9994 0.9317 0.9932 0.9993 0.9267 0.9910 0.9989
firm 2 0.9044 0.9826 0.9966 0.8848 0.9654 0.9926 0.8170 0.9318 0.9837
firm 3 0.8997 0.9811 0.9964 0.8657 0.9693 0.9928 0.8264 0.9452 0.9839
firm 4 0.8889 0.9801 0.9962 0.8671 0.9614 0.9918 0.8201 0.9180 0.9832
N=4, N ′ = 2 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
firm 1∗ 0.9637 0.9964 0.9996 0.9546 0.9955 0.9994 0.9640 0.9967 0.9997
firm 2∗ 0.9704 0.9970 0.9997 0.9643 0.9961 0.9996 0.9595 0.9957 0.9995
firm 3 0.9263 0.9849 0.9966 0.9042 0.9729 0.9933 0.8547 0.9621 0.9885
firm 4 0.9388 0.9865 0.9969 0.9175 0.9695 0.9924 0.8737 0.9553 0.9868
N=5, N ′ = 4 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
firm 1∗ 0.9138 0.9912 0.9992 0.9017 0.9906 0.9990 0.8674 0.9879 0.9987
firm 2 0.8568 0.9705 0.9948 0.8233 0.9485 0.9890 0.8044 0.9302 0.9803
firm 3 0.8539 0.9703 0.9949 0.8542 0.9603 0.9909 0.8224 0.9212 0.9781
firm 4 0.8643 0.9713 0.9950 0.8401 0.9590 0.9918 0.7576 0.9189 0.9779
firm 5 0.8816 0.9731 0.9954 0.8362 0.9590 0.9920 0.7923 0.9217 0.9781
N=5, N ′ = 3 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
firm 1∗ 0.9402 0.9940 0.9993 0.9252 0.9921 0.9993 0.9285 0.9929 0.9992
firm 2∗ 0.9318 0.9931 0.9993 0.9270 0.9923 0.9991 0.9294 0.9932 0.9993
firm 3 0.8999 0.9805 0.9960 0.8642 0.9616 0.9920 0.8401 0.9382 0.9844
firm 4 0.8730 0.9752 0.9955 0.8739 0.9601 0.9922 0.8238 0.9375 0.9864
firm 5 0.8852 0.9775 0.9958 0.8617 0.9589 0.9920 0.8214 0.9330 0.9829
N=5, N ′ = 2 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000 100 1000 10000
firm 1∗ 0.9602 0.9959 0.9996 0.9662 0.9965 0.9998 0.9643 0.9971 0.9998
firm 2∗ 0.9624 0.9962 0.9996 0.9575 0.9958 0.9995 0.9627 0.9962 0.9997
firm 3∗ 0.9583 0.9955 0.9996 0.9569 0.9954 0.9994 0.9601 0.9963 0.9995
firm 4 0.9102 0.9794 0.9957 0.9075 0.9755 0.9941 0.8895 0.9530 0.9883
firm 5 0.9258 0.9837 0.9959 0.9069 0.9739 0.9930 0.8951 0.9573 0.9874
∗ indicates the firms with knowledge of the demand function.
Comparing each entry in Table 2 with the corresponding entry in Table 1, when the number of competing
firms is the same, using the modified DDEP causes the fraction of optimal revenue for firms without knowledge
of demand to increase. This verifies what we previously illustrated in Theorems 3 and 5. Since there exist some
firms with knowledge of the demand functions, fewer firms actually participate in price experimentation. As
the number of firms with knowledge of the demand functions increases, there are two significant observations:
1. The fraction of optimal revenue for firms with knowledge of the demand is not close to or equal to one.
2. The fraction of optimal revenue for firms without knowledge of the demand will increase.
Step 3 in the modified DDEP is the underlying reason for the first observation, even if the pricing of
firms with knowledge of the demand curve are passive to reprice and their pricing does not affect the pricing
of the firms without knowledge of the demand function, the firms with the knowledge of the demand curves
still price according to each firm’s respective best response function. The pricing established in Step 3 will
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be used in the next stage, while the optimal price will be changed once competitors have adjusted prices. In
the first stage, the initial price of each firm is selected randomly in the price interval, such that the optimal
price pi∗1 in the first stage may be far away from the initial price. Hence, the fraction of optimal revenue for
firms with knowledge of the demand function is neither close nor equal to one.
The reason for the second observation is that fewer parameters need to be estimated. Turning our attention
to the cases when N ′ is fixed, one pertinent observation is that the change in N exerts significant effects on
the fraction of optimal revenue. The numerical results are consistent with our analysis.
Remark. A phenomenon which appears numerically but is not theoretically guaranteed is that the fraction
of optimal revenue for firms with knowledge of the demand curve increases as the number of firms without
knowledge of the demand curve decreases. An explanation for this numerical phenomenon is that in our set-
ting, the number of firms participating in price experimentation also affects regret. For different experiments,
such as the number of companies participating in the price experimentation, the number of periods in one
stage is also different.
For example, there are 18 periods in the first stage when N ′ = 2, while there are 32 periods when N ′ = 3.
This means that when we want to compare these results, the number of finishing stages is not the same as in
the case of a fixed time interval T . The smaller the number of firms participating in price experimentation,
the more stages required before the experimentation finishes.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied a non-cooperative game among the firms each seeking to maximize revenue.
The underlying demand-price information is not known a priori for each firm and the demand response is
determined by consumers and competitors. Based on past observations, estimated demand models are used
to make pricing decisions. The equilibrium pricing algorithm is developed for such a system and is combined
with estimation and optimization cycles. The estimation cycle uses a linear regression model to estimate
the linear approximation of the underlying demand model at a previously given price. We show that this
converges to the equilibrium pricing if the algorithm is designed properly. The role of the algorithm is
to guarantee the convergence of pricing decisions. We also conduct an analysis of the convergence rate of
regret, which is unlike worst-case regret used elsewhere in the literature. Regret is defined, in our case, as a
comparison with the optimal price that the firm could make when full information is available.
We use a linear approximation to estimate the unknown demand function. We analyze the linear demand
model in two general scenarios: one being when all competing firms have unknown demand functions, the
other being when a subset of demand functions are unknown. In the first scenario, the linear demand model
captures the impact of all competitors. In the second scenario (partially clairvoyant model), only the impact
of competitors with unknown demand functions is captured. We show that the linear demand model in both
scenarios ensures that pricing decisions converge to the true equilibrium pricing as a result of the algorithm
operation cycle. The analysis and numerical results show that the regret of firms without knowledge of the
demand curve is associated with the number of such firms, while the regret of the firms with knowledge of
the demand curve is not.
Since our work focuses on the pricing decisions of firms in a competitive environment, we do not consider
limitations in market size. In the future, this aspect of could be considered jointly with pricing and inventory
management, adding additional complexity to the problem but making it more realistic.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We first analyze the convergences of the estimated parameters. Define that
W i,1n =
1
In
tn+In∑
t=tn+1
εit, W
i,2
n =
1
In
tn+2In∑
t=tn+In+1
εit, · · · ,W i,mn =
1
In
tn+mIn∑
t=tn+(m−1)In+1
εit,
for m = 1, 2, ..., N + 1. The recursion for the decisions can be written as
pˆn+1 = z(pˆn) + Cn, with Cn = zˆ− z(pˆn),
where zˆ denotes the collection of all firms zi(αˆin+1, βˆ
ij
n+1), which is exactly pˆn+1. To better describe the
relationship between parameter convergence and εi, we denote the estimators of the noiseless case, as in
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equations (6), (7), and (8) by β˘iin+1, β˘
ij
n+1 and α˘
i
n+1 respectively. Hence, we obtain that
βˆiin+1 = −
λi(pˆin + δn, pˆ
−i
n )− λi(pˆn)
δn
− 1
δn
(
W i,jn −W i,1n
)
= −
[
∇piλi(pt) +
1
2
∇2piλi(p′)δn
]
− 1
δn
(−W i,1n +W i,jn )
= β˘ii(pˆin) + C
i
n,βii ,
βˆijn+1 =
λi(pˆjn + δn, pˆ
−j
n )− λi(pˆn)
δn
− 1
δn
(
W i,jn −W i,1n
)
=
[
∇pjλi(pt) +
1
2
∇2pjλi(p′)δn
]
− 1
δn
(
W i,jn −W i,1n
)
= β˘ij(pˆjn) + C
i
n,βij ,
where the second equality follows from Taylors theorem applied to λin with p
′ ≡ (pi, p−i), pi ∈ [pˆin, pˆin + δn]
Cin,βii = −
1
2
∇2pi(p′)δn −
1
δn
(−W i,1n +W i,jn ) ,
Cin,βij =
1
2
∇2pj (p′)δn −
1
δn
(
+W i,jn −W i,1n
)
.
Similarly, we can obtain that
αˆin+1 = λ¯
i + βˆin+1p¯
i
n −
N∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1p¯
j
n
=
1
N + 1
tn+1∑
t=tn+1
λi(pt) +
1
N + 1
(
m=N+1∑
m=1
W i,mn
)
− βˆin+1
(
pˆin +
δn
2
)
+
N∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1
(
pˆjn +
δn
2
)
=
1
N + 1
tn+1∑
t=tn+1
λi(pˆn)−∇piλi(pˆn)pˆin +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∇pjλi(pˆn)pˆjn
+
1
2
N∑
j
∇pjλi(p′′)δn −

1
2
∇piλi(pˆn)δn +
1
2
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∇pjλi(pˆn)δn


+
1
N + 1
(
m=N+1∑
m=1
W i,mn
)
+ Cin,βii
(
pˆin +
δn
2
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Cin,βij
(
pˆin +
δn
2
)
= α˘i(pˆn) + C
i
n,α,
where the third equality follows from Taylors theorem applied to λin with p
′′ ≡ (pi, p−i), where pi ∈
[pˆin, pˆ
i
n + δn], we also obtain
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Cin,αi =
1
2
N∑
j
∇pjλi(p′′)δn −

1
2
∇piλi(pˆn)δn +
1
2
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
∇pjnλ
i(pˆn)δn


+
1
N + 1
(
m=N+1∑
m=1
W i,mn
)
+ Cin,βii(pˆ
i
n +
δn
2
) +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Cin,βij (pˆ
i
n +
δn
2
).
Considering event ω of specific occurrences for random variables εit and thus W
i,m
n , we define a collection of
”good events” in which the accumulated impact of noise on demand is below a given ceiling x, which may
be set later, as follows:
A
i
n =
{
ω :
∣∣W i,mn ∣∣ ≤ x, m = 1, · · · , N + 1} , ∀i.
We define the following constants:
Ki11 = min
pi∈Pi
∣∣λi(p)∣∣ , Ki12 = min
pi∈Pi
∣∣∇piλi(p)∣∣ , Ki13 = min
pj∈Pi
∣∣∇pjλi(p)∣∣ ∀i, j
Ki14 = max
pi∈Pi
∣∣∇piλi(p)∣∣ , Ki15 = max
pj∈Pi
∣∣∇pjλi(p)∣∣ , ∀i, j, and
Ki16 = max
pi∈Pi
∣∣∣∇2piλi(p)∣∣∣ , Ki17 = max
pj∈Pi
∣∣∣∇2pjλi(p)∣∣∣ , ∀i, j.
Let Γ i,1n =
1
2K
i
16δn + 2xδ
−1
n , Γ
j,1
n =
1
2K
i
17δn + 2xδ
−1
n and Γ
i,2
n =
1
2K
i
14δn +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
1
2K
i
15δn + xδ
−1
n +
Γ i,1n
(
pˆi,hn +
δn
2
)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Γ j,1n
(
pˆj,hn +
δn
2
)
be the upper bound of Cin,βii , C
i
n,βij and C
i
n,αi . As n increases, Γ
i,1
n ,
Γ j,1n and Γ
i,2
n converge to zero. This dictates that the upper bound of the difference between α˘
i and αˆin, β˘
ii
and βˆiin , β˘
ij and βˆijn will converge to zero when n grows. Hence, we suppose that the upper bound of this dif-
ference will converge to zero at some point. Let n0 = min
{
n ≥ 0 : Γ i,1n < K
i
12
2 , Γ
j,1
n <
Ki13
2 and Γ
i,2
n <
Ki11
2
}
.
For n ≥ n0 and ω ∈ A in,
∣∣∣Cin,βii ∣∣∣ < Ki122 , ∣∣∣Cin,βij ∣∣∣ < Ki132 and ∣∣∣Cin,αi ∣∣∣ < Ki112 . Based on the previous assumption
about zi, we obtain
Cin = z
i
(
α˘i(pˆin) + C
i
n,αi , β˘
ii(pˆin) + C
i
n,βii , β˘
ij(pˆin) + C
i
n,βij
)
− zi
(
α˘i(pˆin), β˘
ii(pˆin), β˘
ij(pˆin)
)
= ziαi
(
ai,1n , · · · , ai,Nn
)
Cin,αi + z
i
βii
(
ai,1n , · · · , ai,Nn
)
Cin,βii +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
ziβij
(
ai,1n , · · · , ai,Nn
)
Cin,βij ,
for some
(
ai,1n , · · · , ai,Nn
)
on the line segment joining
(
α˘i(pˆin), β˘
ii(pˆin), β˘
ij(pˆin)
)
to(
α˘i(pˆin) + C
i
n,αi , β˘
ii(pˆin) + C
i
n,βii , β˘
ij(pˆin) + C
i
n,βij
)
. For some positive Ki18, with a probability lower bond in
terms of x ∣∣Cin∣∣ ≤ NKi18
[
δn +
x
δn
]
, (19)
Thus, by taking the norm of the recursive decision function with a probability lower bound in terms of x, as
set out in Proposition 3, we obtain
‖pˆn+1 − z(pˆn)‖ ≤ ‖Cn‖, (20)
where Cn =
[
C1n C
2
n · · · CNn
]T
, and Cin can be set at NK
i
18
[
δn +
x
δn
]
according to (19).
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B Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. To start our analysis, we first analyse the probability for a firm obtaining “good” estimators. According
to the definition of the difference Cin,βij and the Hoeffding inequality, to measure the effectiveness of βˆ
i
n+1,
we have the following bound:
P
{∣∣∣βˆiin+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin)∣∣∣ ≤ Ki19
(
δn +
x
δn
)}
≥ 1− 4e−2Inx2 , ∀i. (21)
A similar argument shows that
P
{∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn)∣∣∣ ≤ Kj19
(
δn +
x
δn
)}
≥ 1− 4e−2Inx2 , ∀j. (22)
By the definition of the difference Cin,αi , we obtain
P
{∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣ ≤ K20N
(
δn +
x
δn
+ x
)}
≥P
{∣∣∣−W i,in+1 +W i,1n+1∣∣∣ ≤ 2x, · · · , ∣∣∣W i,N+1n+1 −W j,1n+1∣∣∣ ≤ 2x,
∣∣∣∣∣
N+1∑
m=1
W i,mn+1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2x
}
≥1− 8Ne−2Inx2 , ∀i. (23)
We also have
P
{∣∣∣βˆiin+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin + δn)∣∣∣ ≤ Ki21
(
δn +
x
δn
)}
≥ 1− 4e−2Inx2 , ∀i. (24)
P
{∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣ ≤ Kj21
(
δn +
x
δn
)}
≥ 1− 4e−2Inx2 , ∀i, and (25)
P
{∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1 (pˆn +∆n)∣∣ ≤ NK22
(
δn +
x
δn
+ x
)}
≥ 1− 8Ne−2Inx2 , ∀i, (26)
where pˆn +∆n denotes the price when some firm changes their price to pˆ
i
n + δn in price experimentation.
Taking the intersection of the inequalities above, we obtain
P
{∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣ ≤ NK20
(
δn +
x
δn
+ x
)
,
∣∣∣βˆi1n+1 − β˘i1n+1(pˆ1n)∣∣∣ ≤ K119
(
δn +
x
δn
)
· · ·
∣∣∣βˆiNn+1 − β˘iNn+1(pˆNn )∣∣∣ ≤ KN19
(
δn +
x
δn
)
,
∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣ ≤ K22
(
δn +
x
δn
+ x
)
,
∣∣∣βˆi1n+1 − β˘i1n+1(pˆ1n + δn)∣∣∣ ≤ K121
(
δn +
x
δn
)
· · ·
∣∣∣βˆiNn+1 − β˘iNn+1(pˆNn + δn)∣∣∣ ≤ KN21
(
δn +
x
δn
)}
≥ 1− 24Ne−2Inx2 , ∀i. (27)
As the quantities on both sides of probability event in (21) - (23) are nonnegative, (21) - (23) imply that
P
{∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆin)∣∣∣2 ≤ Ki23
(
δ2n +
x2
δ2n
)}
≥ 1− 4e−2Inx2 , ∀i, j, and (28)
25
P{∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣2 ≤ NK24
(
δ2n +
x2
δ2n
+ x2
)}
≥ 1− 8Ne−2Inx2 , ∀i. (29)
Similar implications of (24) - (26) are
P
{∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣2 ≤ Kj25
(
δ2n +
x2
δ2n
)}
≥ 1− 4e−2Inx2 , ∀i, j and (30)
P
{∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣2 ≤ NK26
(
δ2n +
x2
δ2n
+ x2
)}
≥ 1− 8Ne−2Inx2 , ∀i. (31)
Combining (28) - (31), we obtain
P
{∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣2 + N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin)∣∣∣2 + ∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣2
+
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣2 ≤ K27N
(
δ2n +
x2
δ2n
+ x2
)}
≥ 1− 24Ne−2Inx2 , ∀i, (32)
which is equivalently rewritten as
P
{(
NK28
δ2n
+NK29
)−1( ∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣2 + N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin)∣∣∣2 + ∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣2
+
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣2 −NK27δ2n
)
≥ x2
}
< 24Ne−2Inx
2
, ∀i. (33)
Let x = σ(2 log(In))
1
2 I
− 12
n , we integrate both sides to obtain
E
[(
NK28
δ2n
+NK29
)−1 ( ∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣2 + N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin)∣∣∣2 + ∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣2
+
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣2 −NK27δ2n)
]
≤
∫ +∞
0
24Ne−2Inx
2
dx =
12NK30
In
, ∀i. (34)
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Hence, we have that
E
[ ∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣2 + N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin)∣∣∣2 + ∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣2
+
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣2
]
≤
(
12NK30
In
+
(
NK28
δ2n
+NK29
)−1
NK27δ
2
n
)(
NK28
δ2n
+NK29
)
≤ NK31I−
1
2
n , ∀i, (35)
where the first inequality is obtained by taking the constant out of the expectation, and the second inequality
is obtained by letting δ = I
− 14
n .
We must define a random event to represent the situation when the estimation is sufficiently good. Let
A in denote the event where all the estimated parameters satisfy
{
|αˆin+1− α˘i| ≤ δn+x/δn+x, |βˆijn+1− β˘ij | ≤
δn + x/δn + x, ∀j = 1, · · · , N
}
for firm i. The probability of this event happening is shown in (27), which
can be transformed into
P
{
A
i
n
} ≥ 1− 24Ne−2Inx2 .
Let Bn = {A in occurs, i = 1, · · · , N} represent the random event where all N firms obtain “good” estimation
outcomes A in. Let B
c
n =
{
at least one A in does not occur
}
.
E
[
‖pˆn − p∗‖2
]
≤E
[
‖pˆn − p∗‖2 | Bn
]
P {Bn}+ E
[
‖pˆn − p∗‖2 | Bcn
]
P {Bcn} .
Denote index set Mk =
{
i|A in occurs in the kth repeated permutation
}
to collect the indices i’s such that
A in occurs in the kth repeated permutation. Note that the number of index sets Mk’s is equal to 2
N − 1. Let
event GMkn = {A in occurs ∀i ∈Mk and A jcn occurs ∀j /∈Mk}. Thus, we obtain that
P {Bcn} = P


2N−1⋃
k=1
G
Mk
n

 =
2N−1∑
k=1
P
{
G
Mk
n
} ≤ N∑
1
P
{
A
ic
n
}
.
Hence, we obtain
E ‖pˆn − p∗‖2 ≤E
[
‖pˆn − p∗‖2 | Bn
]
P{Bn}+
∥∥ph − pl∥∥2 N∑
1
P
{
A
ic
n
}
.
For some suitably large positive constant K30, we can obtain the probability bound of a bad event occurring
in the estimation of the demand function, which is
P {Bnc} ≤ 24N2e−2Inx
2 ≤ 24N
2K32
In
. (36)
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Therefore, combining the results of (35) and (36), it follows that
E
[‖z− pˆn+1‖2]
≤ E
[
K233
N∑
i=1
(∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣+ N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin)∣∣∣
+
∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣+
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣
)2]
+
24N2K32
In
∥∥ph − pl∥∥2
≤ E
[
K34
N∑
i=1
(∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣2 + N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin)∣∣∣2
+
∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣2 + N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣2
)]
+
24N2K32
In
∥∥ph − pl∥∥2
≤ N2K1I−
1
2
n . (37)
In the first inequality, the first term of the summation stems from rewriting the ℓ-2 norm and the second
term is a rough bound of the expectation under the event Bcn. The second inequality is derived from (35)
for some proper constant K34. Selecting some suitable constant K1, we obtain the final inequality.
C Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We first note that constants introduced depend on σ. Fix a time horizon T and firm i, and let k =
inf
{
h ≥ 1 : (N + 1)
h∑
i=1
In ≥ T
}
, in which k satisfies logv
(
v−1
(N+1)I0v
T + 1
)
≤ k < logv
(
v−1
(N+1)I0v
T + 1
)
+ 1
based on the summation of a geometric sequence. The expected revenue difference after T periods is therefore
given by
Di = E
[
T∑
t=1
[
ri(p
i∗, p−i∗)− ri(pit, p−it )
]]
.
According to the assumption, the revenue function ri is a concave function on (pi,l, pi,h) and twice differen-
tiable. Applying a Taylor approximation for ri(p
i, p−i) around p∗,
ri(pi, p−i)= ri(pi∗, p−i∗) +∇ri(pi∗, p−i∗)T (p− p∗)
+
1
2
(p− p∗)T∇2ri(pi∗, p−i∗)(p− p∗).
Note that∇ri(pi∗, p−i∗)T =
[
pi∗∇p1λi(p∗), · · · , pi∗∇piλi(p∗)+λi(p∗), · · · , pi∗∇pNλi(p∗)
]
, where pi∗∇piλi(p∗)+
λi(p∗) = 0 at the maximum revenue. Since pi∗ is a maximizer of ri(p
i∗, p−i∗),
∣∣∇ri(pi∗, p−i∗)∣∣ can be
bounded by some positive constant K35 and
1
2
∥∥∇2ri(pi∗, p−i∗)∥∥ can be bounded by some positive con-
stant K36. Notice that we cannot tell whether the term ∇ri(pi∗, p−i∗)T (p − p∗) is lesser or greater than
1
2
(p− p∗)T∇2ri(pi∗, p−i∗)(p− p∗). We have
∣∣ri(pi, p−i)− ri(pi∗, p−i∗)∣∣≤ K35 |p− p∗|+K36 ‖p∗ − p‖2
≤ K37
[|p∗ − p|+ ‖p− p∗‖2] ,
28
where K37 = max {K35,K36}. The ℓ-1 norm is used here since the term ∇ri(pi∗, p−i∗)T (p − p∗) can be a
positive or negative scalar.
It can be derived that the revenue difference of firm i for any stage n under the synchronous price control
is
[
ri (p∗)− ri(pˆn)
]
+
[
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆin + δn, pˆ−in )
]
+
[
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆin, pˆ1n + δn, pˆ−i,−i6=1n )
]
+ · · ·+ [ri(p∗)− ri(pˆin, pˆNn + δn, pˆ−i,−i6=Nn )]
=
[
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆn) + ri(p∗)− ri(pˆin + δn, pˆ−in ) + ri(p∗)− ri(pˆn)−
(
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆn)
)]
+
[
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆin, pˆ1n + δn, pˆ−i,−i6=1n ) + ri(p∗)− ri(pˆn)−
(
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆn)
)]
+ · · ·+
[
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆin, pˆNn + δn, pˆ−i,i6=Nn ) + ri(p∗)− ri(pˆ)−
(
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆ))]
+∇ri(p∗)T (pˆn − p∗) + 1
2
(pˆn − p∗)T∇2ri(p∗)(pˆn − p∗).
For all t = tn + iIn + 1, · · · , tn + (i+ 1)In, we have pt = (pˆin + δn, pˆ−in ). Hence,
[
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆin + δn, pˆ−in )
]
=
[
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆin + δn, pˆ−in ) + ri(p∗)− ri(pˆn)−
(
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆn)
)]
=
[
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆn)
]
+
[
ri(p∗)−
(
ri(p∗) +∇ri(p∗)T ((pˆin + δ, pˆ−in )− p∗)
+
1
2
(
(pˆin + δ, pˆ
−i
n )− p∗
)T∇2ri(p∗)((pˆin + δ, pˆ−in )− p∗))− (ri(p∗)− (ri(p∗)
+∇ri(p∗)T (pˆn − p∗) + 1
2
(pˆn − p∗)T∇2ri(p∗)(pˆn − p∗)
)]
= [ri(p∗)− ri(p)] +
[
∇ri(p∗)T (pˆn − (pˆin + δ, pˆ−in ))
+
1
2
(
pˆn − (pˆin + δ, pˆ−in )
)T∇2ri(p∗)(pˆn − (pˆin + δ, pˆ−in ))]
= [ri(p∗)− ri(p)]− 1
2
(
(pˆin + δ, pˆ
−i
n )− p∗
)T∇2ri(p∗)((pˆin + δ, pˆ−in )− p∗)
+
1
2
(pˆn − p∗)T∇2ri(p∗)(pˆn − p∗)
≤ [ri(p∗)− ri(p)]+K36δ2.
Taking Taylors expansion for ri(pˆin + δn, pˆ
−i
n ) and r
i(pˆn) around p
∗, we obtain the first inequality. Since
∇ri(p∗)T (pˆn − (pˆin + δ, pˆ−in )) = 0, the last equality is obtained. The terms
1
2
(
(pˆin + δ, pˆ
−i
n )− p∗
)T∇2ri(p∗)((pˆin + δ, pˆ−in )− p∗) and 12(pˆn − p∗)T∇2ri(p∗)(pˆn − p∗) are bounded by−K36
∥∥(pˆin+
δ, pˆ−in )− p∗
∥∥2 and −K36∥∥pˆn − p∗∥∥2, respectively. Thus, we obtain the last inequality. We also have
∇ri(p∗)T (pˆn − (pˆjn + δ, pˆ−jn )) < 0. Similarly for all t = tn + jIn + 1, · · · , tn + (j + 1)In, we have pt =
29
(pˆjn + δn, pˆ
−j
n ) and an identical inequality.[
ri(p∗)− ri(pˆin, pˆjn + δ, pˆ−i,−i6=jn ) + ri(p∗)− ri(p)−
(
ri(p∗)− ri(p))]
≤ [ri(p∗)− ri(p)] +K36δ2.
Combining the results above, the revenue difference of firm i becomes
Di≤ E
[
k∑
n=1
([
ri(p∗)− ri(p)] + [ri(p∗)− ri(pit + δn, p−it )] + [ri(p∗)− ri(pit, p1t + δn, p−i,−i6=1t )]
+ · · ·+
[
ri(p∗)− ri(pit, pNt + δn, p−i,−i6=Nt )
])
In
]
≤ E
[
k∑
n=1
(
(N + 1)(ri(p∗)− ri(p)) +Nδ2) In
]
≤ K37
k∑
n=1
(
(N + 1)E ‖pˆn − p∗‖2 +Nδ2n + (N + 1)E |pˆn − p∗|
)
In, (38)
where k = inf
{
h ≥ 1 : (N + 1)
h∑
i=1
In ≥ T
}
. The first inequality represents the revenue difference generated
during the DDEP operations. The second inequality arises as the revenue difference in each time interval In
has the same upper bound. The third inequality is derived using the Taylor approximation for ri(p) at p∗.
According to the results of Theorem 1, the upper bound of E
[‖pˆn − p∗‖2] is N2K5I− 12n . Thus, we obtain
the above result. Now, we turn to finding the upper bound of E [|pˆn − p∗|]. Similar to the arguments in
Proposition 3, we change the inequalities (27) into
P
{∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣+ N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin)∣∣∣+ ∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣
+
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣ ≥ K38N
(
δn +
x
δn
+ x
)}
< 24N2e−2Inx
2
, ∀i. (39)
Note that
(
δn +
x
δn
+ x
)
≤ K39x/δn and that E[X ] =
∫ +∞
0 P{X ≥ t}dt for every non-negative random
variable X . (The last equation is referred to as “tail-integral formula”.) Integrating both sides leads to
E
[ ∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣+ N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin)∣∣∣+ ∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣
+
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣
]
≤ δ−1n
∫ +∞
0
Ne−2Inx
2
dx ≤ NK40I−
3
4
n , ∀i (40)
30
for some constant K40. Similar to (37), we have
E [|z− pˆn+1|]
≤ E
[
K28
N∑
i=1
∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn)∣∣+
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘iin+1(pˆin)∣∣∣
+
∣∣αˆin+1 − α˘in+1(pˆn +∆n)∣∣+ N∑
j=1
∣∣∣βˆijn+1 − β˘ijn+1(pˆjn + δn)∣∣∣
]
+
24NK32
In
∥∥ph − pl∥∥
≤ NK41I−
3
4
n (41)
for some constant K41. Using (38), (40) and (41), we can derive as follows:
Di ≤ K42
k∑
n=1
N2(N + 1)
[
I
− 12
n + δ
2
n + I
− 34
n
]
In
≤ K43
k∑
n=1
N2((N + 1)In)
1
2 = N2K43
((N + 1)(I0v))
1
2
1− v 12 (1− v
n−1
2 − 1)
≤ N2K43 (N + 1)
1
2 (I0v)
1
2
1− v 12
(
v
logv(
v−1
(N+1)I0v
T+1)+1−1
) 1
2 ≤ N2K6T 12 ,
where K42 = max{K37,K41}. The first inequality is obtained by employing the results of (41) in (38).
Selecting some suitable constant K43, we can make the order of In consistent. The equality comes from the
summation of a geometric sequence according to the constant k defined previously. This theorem implies
that using this pricing policy, even if the underlying demand function is unknown, the difference due to
the gap between the equilibrium point obtained at each stage pˆn+1 and the clairvoyant GNE p
∗ is at most
N2K6T
1
2 .
D Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. This result is derived from the proofs of Theorem 2, Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 shown previously.
Having established the price convergence when all firms are unaware of the demand functions, we now verify
whether there are similar results when some firms know the demand functions.
Suppose N − N ′ firms already know the demand function, then only N ′ firms need to estimate their
demand function. According to the proof of Lemma 2, it follows that
βˆijn+1 =
λi(pn; pˆ
j
n + δn)− λi(pn)
δn
− 1
δn
(
W i,jn −W i,1n
)
=
[
∇pjλi(pt) +
1
2
∇2pjλi(p′)δn
]
− 1
δn
(
W i,jn −W i,1n
)
= β˘ijn+1 + C
ij
n,βij ,
Hence, the inequality in Proposition 2 changes to
‖p∗ − z(pˆn)‖ ≤ ‖Cn‖,
where Cn ≡
[
C1n, · · · , CN
′
n
]
. Recall that N ′ represents the number of firms who do not know the demand
function. Then, the probability in Proposition 3 (36) also changes to
P {Bn} ≥ 1− 24N
′2K32
In
.
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Combine these two inequalities above, the convergence results of equilibrium can be obtained; that is,
E
[
‖pˆn+1 − p∗‖2
]
≤ N ′2K47I−
1
2
n . (42)
Based on the proof of Theorem 2, similar results can be obtained:
Ri ≤ N ′2K8T 12 .
E Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. We first analyze the regret among firms without knowledge of the demand curve. This proof is similar
to that of Theorem 3. The major difference relates to the best response. The best response operator in the
partially clairvoyant model is zi
(
αˆ(pˆt), βˆ(pˆt)
)
where the inputs αˆ and βˆ are different from the inputs of the
best response operator in the full model. Fixing firm i, the parameter αˆin+1 in the full model is
αˆin+1 = λ
i(pˆn) + βˆ
ii
n+1pˆ
i
n −
N∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1pˆ
j
n,
while αˆin+1 in the partially-clairvoyant model is
αˆin+1 = λ
i(pˆn) + βˆ
ii
n+1pˆ
i
n −
N ′∑
j,j 6=i
βˆijn+1pˆ
j
n.
The difference of α between the partially-clairvoyant model and the full model is
∑N−N ′
k=1 β
ik
n+1p
k
n. For all
t = tn + 1, · · · , tn + In, we have that pt = (pˆin, pˆ−in ). Thus,∣∣pi∗t − pit∣∣
=
∣∣∣zi(α˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ), β˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ))− zi(αˆ(pˆn), βˆ(pˆn))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
zi
(
α˘(pi∗t , pˆ
−i
n ), β˘(p
i∗
t , pˆ
−i
n )
)− zi(α˘(pˆn), β˘(pˆn))+
N−N ′∑
k=1
β˘ikn+1(p
k
n − pkn+1)
β˘iin+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ ‖Cn‖
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
N−N ′∑
k=1
β˘ikn+1(p
k
n − pk∗ − pkn+1 + pk∗)
β˘iin+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ ‖Cn‖
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
β˘ijn+1(p
j
n − pj∗ − pjn+1 + pj∗)
β˘iin+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ ‖Cn‖
≤ K48 |pˆn+1 − p∗|+ ‖Cin‖. (43)
As pi∗t and p
i
t are the fixed points of z
i
(
α˘(pi∗t , pˆ
−i
n ), β˘(p
i∗
t , pˆ
−i
n )
)
and zi
(
αˆ(pˆn), βˆ(pˆn)
)
, respectively, we can
obtain the first equality.. The second equality transforms the operator zi
(
αˆ(pˆn), βˆ(pˆn)
)
in the flawed demand
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model into the operator in the full model. The last inequality uses the results of price convergence in the ℓ-1
norm and selects some appropriate constant K48 to cover the term (p
j
n − p∗ − pjn+1 + pj∗). Using a result
implied in the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain that E [|pˆn+1 − p∗|] ≤ N ′K49I−
3
4
n . Combining the inequality
above and (43), one obtains
E
[∥∥pi∗t − pit∥∥2] ≤ N ′K50I− 12n .
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3, the regret bound can be obtained as follows:
Ri ≤ N ′K9T 12 .
We then analyze the regret of the firms with knowledge of the demand curve. The firms with the knowledge
of the demand curves do not need to adjust prices. We divide the price experimentation in Step 1 of the
modified DDEP into two parts and analyze the regret separately. First, in the first In periods, there is no
firm adjusting price. According to the proof of Theorem 3, for all t = tn + 1, · · · , tn + In, pt = (pˆin, pˆ−in ).
Thus,
∣∣pi∗t − pit∣∣ = ∣∣∣zi(α˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ), β˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ))− zi(α˘(pˆn), β˘(pˆn))∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣pi∗t − zi(α˘(pˆn), β˘(pˆn))∣∣∣ = 0. (44)
Second, in periods in which firms without knowledge of the demand curves have changed their price, suppose
that firm j has adjusted its price, for all t = tn+ jIn+1, · · · , tn+(j+1)In, we arrive at pt = (pˆjn+ δn, pˆ−jn )∣∣pi∗t − pit∣∣
=
∣∣∣zi(α˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ), β˘(pi∗t , pˆ−in ))− zi(αˆ(pˆn), βˆ(pˆn))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣zi(α˘(pi∗t , pˆ−i\jn , pˆjn + δn), β˘(pi∗t , pˆ−i\jn , pˆjn + δn))− zi(α˘(pˆn), β˘(pˆn))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣zi
pˆjn
δn + z
i
(
α˘(pi∗t , pˆ
−i
n ), β˘(p
i∗
t , pˆ
−i
n )
)− zi(α˘(pˆn), β˘(pˆn))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣zi
pˆjn
δn + p
i∗
t − zi
(
α˘(pˆn), β˘(pˆn)
)∣∣∣ = K51δn, ∀j. (45)
In the same way,
E
[∥∥pi∗t − pit∥∥2] ≤ K52I− 12n .
Hence, the following regret bound is obtained.
Ri ≤ K10T 12 .
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